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Abstract Political frameworks such as assimilation, accommodation and multicultur-
alism that have sought to address difference have failed to achieve political equality and
inclusion for immigrants, driven primarily by the flawed understanding of culture and
identity in multicultural states. Offering a brief critique of these models, this essay
advocates the use of deliberative theory in citizenship education as instrumental to
building capacities for inclusive citizenship and cultivating belonging and inclusion in
diverse societies. Deliberative practice enables the reconceptualization of citizenship as
performative, involving responsibilities for dialogic engagement. Such capacities and
responsibilities are indispensable for a just political order in multicultural societies.
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Introduction
Although multiculturalism and the existence of diversity in societies is not a novel
phenomenon, nation states around the world continue to struggle with difference.
Events in recent history have resulted in an unprecedented proliferation of multina-
tion states, calling for a critical reconsideration of political frameworks and apparatus
to account for the demographic implications of mass-scale immigration witnessed in
the Twentieth Century (Castles 2003; Zlotnik 2001). Multicultural societies have long
been working through different political arrangements with a view to locating the
political ‘other’ within the framework of the liberal democratic nation state. These
attempts have entailed the use of various models of inclusion of immigrants, ranging
from assimilation and accommodation to the use of liberal multiculturalism and
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multiculturalism as self-governance. Recent scholarship has revealed that each of
these paradigms is undergirded by certain conceptions of culture and identity which,
in the case of the former, fail to account for the fluidity of culture, and in the case of
the latter, are based on a predominantly liberal understanding of one’s identity and the
relationship between the self and society (Spinner-Halev 1996). Insofar as these
models for political inclusion remain grounded in discourse steeped in quintessen-
tially liberal conceptions of culture, identity and the good life, they fail to account for
variant conceptions of the good life and their impact on the construction of the self as
an individual and the relational self as well as the role of culture and politics in
facilitating equal access and means for the pursuit of life goals in a manner consonant
with one’s worldviews. The result is the exclusion of certain groups from substantive
and meaningful citizenship in multicultural polities.
This essay interrogates some of the discourse on citizenship and traces the role of
identity and culture in informing the modern conceptualization of the ‘national identity’.
In deconstructing the concepts of identity and culture, this essay illustrates that the
characterization of both culture and identity as monolithic and static is fundamentally
flawed in light of theories of identity-matrixing and the fluidity of culture, particularly
given modern society’s exposure to multiple cultural paradigms. It further argues that
insofar as citizenship is predicated on an outdated understanding of these concepts, it
will continue to render the modern immigrant a perpetual émigré regardless of their
formal incorporation into the state’s apparatus as a national or citizen.
This state of affairs is exacerbated by a number of features that are inherent to the
liberal political framework. First, the nation-state model, which remains the predom-
inant model for political organization, continues to extend rights and citizenship
status based on traditional tests signaling connection or contribution to the nation-
state, for example, birthplace, descent, loyalty, contribution to the community through
residence and employment or national defense. Although an array of constitutional
and human rights are extended to all persons present within the physical borders of
the state by virtue of the territoriality principle, citizenship usually avails of an
additional bundle of rights, typically, self-governance rights including the right to
vote, be represented in office and to stand in elections. Upon acquiring citizenship or
naturalizing as a national of the immigration country, the assumption is that the
immigrant, now formally a national or citizen, has developed requisite attributes that
render his or her ties to the nation sufficiently concrete, dependable and essentially,
that he or she is now a part and parcel of the nation, subscribing fully to its ideological
and political values and ethos.
The failure of the modern nation-state to effectively manage multicultural popu-
lations is attributable to this binary perception of identities as either rooted or
uprooted, included or excluded, immigrant or national, passive and unengaged or
active and engaged. The inability of national and political structures to account for the
struggle invariably experienced by some immigrants as they negotiate multiple and
sometimes, conflicting, aspects of their transitioning identities ends with those who
are different being chalked out as the archetypical minority. This breeds the popular
imagination and scripting of the immigrant as solitary, different, ‘alien’ and passive
members of the polity, which characterization is then used to justify the treatment of
immigrants as mere subjects of the political order rather than equal partners in the
making of the social contract that is said to foreshadow the liberal democratic
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framework (Rawls 2001). The perceived lack of agency and capacity to contribute
effectively to political discourse results in the distortion of their role in the political
process and, indeed the misrepresentation of their interests and their true nature as a
people as well as their capacities for political agency.
Second, democratic practice today is marred by groups of self-interested individ-
uals who vote collectively to follow their own agendas and as such, the ‘collective
will’ represents less the result of a reasoned, thought through position of the com-
munity, and rather more, a mere aggregation of different collective interests, resulting
in the povertization of democratic outcomes. This, coupled with their general lack of
political power and minority status, minority interests and rights are routinely polit-
icized in public discourse, often resulting in negative verdict on issues affecting such
interests. This has led to a crisis of governance that is obsessed with governance of
the other,’ rendering the rights of the groups concerned irrelevant, diluted or
oppressed.
This state of affairs is driven by multiple factors. The lack of political and
institutional mechanisms to facilitate the effective inclusion of immigrant nationals
into the polity, the failure to recognize the role of identity politics and its invidious
influence on the development of law and policy to the detriment of immigrant
minorities, and the general lack of any efforts to develop a framework through which
to cultivate a culture of civic responsibility and ethical engagement in the public
sphere. Together, these circumstances have created an atmosphere of distrust and
tainted the process of effective civic engagement to enable a responsible discourse
and outcomes that are in the broader interests of the multicultural society as a whole.
In advocating a ‘performative’ vision of citizenship, this essay builds on the
critique of the conceptualizations of identity and culture, arguing that the inherent
properties of culture and identity as properly recognized offer unique opportunities
for influencing the evolution of individual and group identities and their reception of
values and norms in multicultural societies as they interact with societal structures
and processes. This requires a reorientation of modern democratic practice towards
deliberative practices, a direction where public reason is brought back to the drawing
board as the primary justification for decisions and policies. Furthermore, access to
this space for public deliberation is to be expanded to include all groups and
individuals. There is a need to extend the role of minorities beyond ‘subjects’ and
to reconstitute them as individuals and groups with a civic responsibility. Such a
public deliberative sphere, in which public reason is to reign supreme, would serve to
improve capacities for engaging the ‘other’, provide opportunities for cooperation,
reduce distance between communities, enable the pursuit of common goals and
reduce spheres of perceived and actual distance and ultimately, acclimatize the groups
to extend their circle of trust to include other political actors. When seen to exercise
their civic responsibilities in a manner that aligns with the common pursuit of the
general good, particularly by drawing on the discourse of public reason, the qualities
of loyalty, sense of peoplehood and belonging to a nation rooted in nationalism and
that national education strives to achieve, will materialize through these practical
experiences rather than remain mere theoretical aspirations or misguided notions of
the need to demonize the other as part of one’s display of allegiance to the nation.
Finally, this essay argues that national education needs to be reformed into
citizenship education in order for this new political order to take hold and materialize.
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Whilst there are aspects of political practices that would require critical review and
change, with a view to a longer-term development of a discourse society that is built
on a firm foundation of values that characterize inclusion, good faith, virtuosity,
reasoned deliberation and capacities for continuing and critical self-reflection. It is
envisioned that this will help cultivate a culture of participatory democratic practice in
which nonpartisan discussions can be had and reasoned deliberation can be applied to
the democratic moment of decision-making. This type of civic engagement will
inculcate strong bonds of membership, commonality of purpose and ultimately, trust.
In time, this trust can be capitalized upon to serve achieve the most fundamental and
difficult goals of justice, a substantively equal and inclusive society.
Part II of this essay examines the nature of political arrangements that have sought
to present immigrants with a space for inclusion into the national framework,
examining their capacities for impartiality and equal treatment towards individuals
and groups yielding from backgrounds that are different when compared to the
predominantly Anglo-Western, Judeo-Christian sensibilities that characterize the
ethos of modern liberal democratic countries. It argues that the terms based on which
the paradigms offer inclusion are inherently liberal in their ideological foundations.
As such, they fail to offer meaningful integration to immigrant communities seeking
long-term inclusion into society on equal terms because inclusion is conditioned on
the acceptance of liberal ideological underpinnings that substantively represent pre-
requisites for the acquisition or realization of equal citizenship and argues that the net
result is that modern liberal democratic framework singles out particular communities
for exclusion.
Part III unpacks the notions of identity and culture, drawing on the critique of their
current conceptualizations and liberal underpinnings presented in the preceding
section. It argues that identity and culture are not static but rather, are in a state of
constant flux as they interact with multiple social forces that alter them with each
interaction, just as these social structures are themselves altered by this exchange.
Building on this, the section highlights opportunities for engaging difference mean-
ingfully in multicultural societies.
Part IV provides a brief overview of modern democratic practice in liberal
democratic states and sets up a case for re-conceptualization of citizenship as
‘performative’. It further emphasized the role of deliberative democratic practices
in ensuring justice in political processes and their outcomes in multicultural societies.
Part V introduces a framework for citizenship education that can serve the ends of a
model of deliberative democracy. In Conclusion, Part VI by constituting citizens that
are virtuous, exercise their democratic rights responsibly through reasoned civic
engagement and who can contribute to the noble task of un-working the deleterious
impact of past atrocities and historical prejudice that have marginalized immigrant
communities.
The political organization of multicultural societies and the politics
of difference: accommodation, assimilation and integration
The existing impasse on the calibration of difference in modern multicultural socie-
ties can be traced back to the models of governance employed by the governing
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regimes. Classic immigration countries have attempted to manage their diverse
populations through various policies designed to ensure minimal disturbance to the
foundational values and systems of the receiving community. Most have adopted
models of assimilation and differential exclusion. Assimilation seeks to break down
differences between immigrants and citizens by encouraging national language edu-
cation and familiarization with cultural and social practices of the nation. Differential
exclusion restricts the immigrants’ ability to be incorporated into the society as
settlers through its strict policies against long-term settlement by these groups. The
primary aim of allowing immigrants into these countries was to benefit from their
labor during the industrialization period (Castles 2003). It was only in the late 70s and
early 80s that these policies progressed towards more accommodative models in light
of human rights developments. These held governments accountable for serious
human rights violations. In recognition of the rights of ethnic communities, immi-
gration countries have gradually transformed their policies to accommodate them,
however, not without antagonizing public sentiment at home. This has led to the
isolation and racialization of and discrimination against the “other”. Despite this,
ethnic communities developed strong intra-group structures to serve their needs and
have continued to survive in their distinct neighborhoods and communities (Castles
and Miller 1998).
Among democratic nations, models of political arrangements have ranged between
those encompassing varying degrees of accommodation of ethnic groups’ cultural
and religious rights and practices to assimilationist models that seek to eliminate
difference through encouraging compliance with and commitment to mainstream
values, sometimes mandating this indirectly through citizenship policies and other
requirements for naturalization.1 Very rarely do states allow internal self-governance,
which has usually been reserved for groups that have been recognized as First
Nations or indigenous to the land concerned.2
Accommodative models are more widely known as multicultural models take a
variety of forms but generally, policies of multiculturalism recognize minority groups
as having distinct attributes which find their just expression in their own language,
culture, and social etiquette. Thus, multiculturalism recognizes the rights of commu-
nities to maintain their cultural, linguistic and social systems and to be protected
equally against the intrusion of any of their constitutional rights in this regard.
However, in most of its modern forms, multicultural policy is conditioned on the
1 For example, the United Kingdom takes a liberal democratic approach, premising its decisions to
accommodate or reject certain practices based on the foundational principles protected by a liberal
constitution underpinned by principles of human rights and other constitutional rights. Canada, on the
other hand, adopts the multicultural political model, allowing communities a wider space in which to
practice certain aspects of their culture or religion. Ultimately, however, Canada too, is insistent on the
requirement that practices comply with the demands of constitutional equality and human rights protections
as provided for in the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1981. France, on the
other hand, prohibits the public manifestation of religious affiliations and generally disallows special
accommodation on grounds of religion.
2 The First Peoples Nations of Canada, for example, enjoy such rights of self-governance. However, there
continue to be struggles between the groups and the federal government in seeking to assert at least minimal
authority over the groups’ practices, particularly those involving the determination of rights of inheritance
of First Nations status, marriage between individuals from the different Nations and inheritance, for
example.
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requirement that minority group practices be in conformity with basic principles of
equality and non-discrimination and obey the law. In essence, accommodation
depends on compliance with liberal principles. This section identifies the broad
framework of these models and offers a brief critique for some of their critical
failings.
Liberalism as a model for multicultural citizenship
Liberalism as a theory of citizenship prioritizes autonomy and liberty, allowing the
individuals to pursue their private interests without interference from the state. It is
predicated on the idea that all individuals should be free to pursue their visions of a
good life. The liberal democratic constitutional framework serves to ensure, at least in
theory, that all people are afforded equal protection from government infringement of
their liberties in their pursuit of this good life. In order to ensure that this protection is
extended to all citizens, liberalism demands all public institutions to comply with the
principles of equality and non-discrimination.
Liberalism’s ideological framework thus offers terms of inclusion as long as they
meet standards of equality. This is imperative to lend credibility and legitimacy to the
justness of the liberal paradigm and its characterization as a framework that facilitates
the pursuit of various versions of the good life. Therein however, lies liberalism’s
paradox insofar as it seeks to exclude from its framework the accommodation of
groups that impose unequal terms on certain members in their groups (Coleman
1996). It has been argued therefore, that liberalism promotes certain visions of the
good and as such, equality is conditioned on groups sharing liberal ideals (Spinner-
Halev 1996). Accommodative practices have therefore suffered from the charge of
ethnocentric biases given that liberal values are applied to adjudge the acceptability of
practices for the purposes of multicultural accommodation. On these terms then, the
liberal project has long been explained against the backdrop of a social contract.
The reason why liberalism apparently succeeds as a suitable framework for
accommodation is that by safeguarding equal rights for all in the public sphere,
liberalism relegates culture to the private realm, where people are free to practice
their beliefs as they desire. By keeping these differences grounded in culture and
religion firmly out of the public eye using this dichotomy between the public and
private, liberalism privatizes culture although it can appear in public but subject to the
principles of equality and non-discrimination. The privatization of difference gives
the impression that the polity as a whole need not deal with cultural difference.
However, as recent examples have revealed, the divide between public and private
spheres is not clear-cut and governments have been challenged by acts manifested in
private due to their strong implications in the public sphere.3 In light of the recent
debunking of this artificial distinction and the recognition of the fluidity between
public and private spheres has exacted a more discerning approach from the liberal
framework. The challenge this has presented has left liberal governments scrambling
3 For example, the implications for liberalism and its inability to deal with the challenge of difference
effectively and on an equally across all groups has been most acutely felt in cases involving manifestation
of religious beliefs at school and at work in the United Kingdom in the cases of R (Begum) v. Governors of
Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15 and Ahmed v. UK (1982) 4 EHRR 126.
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for a suitable alternative approach to the conceptualization of cultural and religious
difference as systems that necessarily have a ‘public’ dimension.
Liberalism is particularly skeptical of affording any political or legal status to
groups (Spinner-Halev 1996). Liberal theory affords protection to individuals on the
assumption that all their interests can be adequately protected based on the recogni-
tion of their needs as individuals. However, the theory overlooks the role of individ-
uals within the collective, ignoring the critical relational influence of group
membership on the constitution of one’s identity. Liberalism assumes that through
the protection of individuals, their membership within a particular group is adequate-
ly secured. Thus, whilst liberalism protects individual rights, indirectly, it facilitates
the suppression of group rights through its framework. The theory fails to appreciate
the need for specific protection of group rights as an aspect of enabling the joint
pursuit of common life goals of a group as a group, or the intricate relationship
between the individual and the group they identify with. Indeed, a reading of Charles
Taylor’s Sources of the Self (Taylor 1992) against the liberal framework for the
recognition of individual rights underscores the importance of recognizing the liberal
values and presumptions underlying liberalism’s characterizing of individuals, their
relationships with the community and the government and their needs. This
individual-centered conception of identity fails to capture the role of group member-
ship in the constitution of identity. It further fails to address the dynamic between
individual and group identity and its critical contribution to pursuing a life of
meaning. Thus, as an accommodative theory, liberalism fails with respect to those
groups for whom group identity and performative aspects of one’s identity in the
‘public’ sphere require protection in order for their vision of the good life to be
meaningfully recognized.
In light of the terms for inclusion presented by liberalism and the framework’s
inherent preference for liberal values and modes of organizing the self and commu-
nity, minority groups whose worldviews do not comply or fit neatly within this frame
are excluded from autonomous self-governance or the protection of their key consti-
tutional rights that would enable them to pursue the good life. Moreover, working
against a framework that is already pitted against groups and non-liberal values,
minorities necessarily struggle without political power as they often lack the means
and resources to adequately represent their interests in a political process that is
skewed towards certain outcomes, both systemically and substantively given the
force of majority voices. Although individually, they have rights, majoritarian politics
prevents them from having the desired impact in terms of numbers without adequate
counter-majoritarian or affirmative action measures in place.
Multiculturalism: accommodation through law or exceptions to the law?
On the other hand, some models of multiculturalism that afford group rights to
minorities have resulted in the fragmentization of multicultural society, often con-
cretizing boundaries between different ethnic groups. Majority ethnic groups become
wary of the differential treatment afforded to newcomers, causing resentment towards
them. Furthermore, the extension of autonomy to minority ethnic groups vis-à-vis
their members results in the deregulation of activities that traditionally fall within the
state’s prerogative, for example, equality and non-discrimination. Such a separate
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system for the dispensation of justice and the protection of rights depletes the
possibility of and the incentive for the development of a ‘national’ attachment to
the host community, thereby further isolating minority groups from the national
majority. This serves as a disincentive for any future engagement between minority
and majority ethnic groups as they are seen as having polarized interests. The struggle
for political recognition becomes one for wresting power from majority groups to
divide among the different minority ethnic groups in society. There being no common
agenda between the different groups, they generally tend not to work together. These
circumstances can result in a critical lack of social cohesion and political deadlock
across a range of issues.
Feminist scholars have also argued that group rights afforded under multicultural
arrangements, lead to oppression of women and children whose rights may be at risk
under regimes where the groups’ or collective interest is prioritized over the needs
and rights of individual members. This may result in the perpetuation of discrimina-
tion and patriarchal practices that are characterized as endemic within certain
communities.
There are limitations to both approaches. The problem is not necessarily the
framework but the fact that accommodative frameworks are generally unaccompa-
nied by complementary features which serve to reduce difference or enhance inter-
cultural exchanges. If anything, in their present forms, they serve to antagonize all
groups in multicultural societies, pitting them against each other often leading to
confrontational politics. Both paradigms entrench differences as a result of growing
negativity, persistent ‘othering’ that is reinforced through policy-making processes
and policies themselves, and the reinforcement of the historical power dynamic
between the ‘colonizer’ and the ‘colonized’. The complete lack of identification
between different groups results from the tensions produced by the unequal political
powers and particularly, the overwhelming power of the dominant group insofar as it
is in a position to ‘recognize’ or ‘tolerate’ whilst the minority is subject to this
domination through the expression of its political will.
Existing accommodative frameworks tend to break down existing attachments.
Liberalism or versions of civic republicanism seek to assimilate and create uniform
citizens through the imposition of a set of values whereas multicultural measures
result in group exclusion or isolation. Both liberal and multicultural policies generally
fail to recognize the intrinsic boundedness of culture to minorities’ identity and
‘cultural citizenship’ as an essential component to their self-determination.
Assimilation stifles cultural identification, particularly the community-expression
dimension of it, whereas accommodation distorts it or suppresses it in its authentic
form. Both are damaging and marginalize the communities concerned, rendering
minorities outsiders to their own communities but also, in the mainstream society.
Multiculturalism has been criticized in recent years for its rigid focus on liberal
values and its general disregard for the merits of empowerment through responsibil-
ity, reciprocity and mutuality as opposed to the rights-oriented model, which focuses
on the dichotomy between the subject and the government as the protector of these
rights. Multiculturalism based on liberal ideology has failed to include minorities
through models of citizenship that enable the coexistence of cultural difference and
belonging to the nation within a single individual. This calls for greater synchronicity
between the recognition of cultural difference, civic equality and civic engagement
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rights and practice in plurinational states and a more sophisticated understanding of how
identities are formed andmaintained. At either extreme, both the liberal andmulticultural
paradigms run the risk of fragmentation of multicultural societies. However, if coupled
with certainmeasures that seek to cultivate greater participation ofminoritygroupswithin
society, to reduceotheringand thedeleterious impactofcertainpolicies, these frameworks
would be better able to achieve the goal of a stable, just and inclusive society.
Brysk and Shafir have referred to the plight of minorities in such societies as the
‘citizenship gap’ (2004). The status of some individuals in societies where citizenship
is primarily defined by birth, descent or blood and sometimes by residence, achieve-
ment or other identity, is such that they lack the usual bundle of rights that they would
ordinarily have if globalization and its effects were adequately accounted for and
understood. Although globalization brings with it new opportunities and forms of
intercultural exchange, from a governance perspective, the opportunities merely
provide certain ‘access’ rights but without the “membership or responsibility” that
comes with citizenship (Brysk and Shafir 2004). Whilst some people find themselves
in a state of dual citizenship, there are those whose citizenship status is ambiguous or
second-class, for example, ethnic groups or tribal and rural inhabitants. These people
fall through the ‘citizenship gap’ (Brysk and Shafir 2004).
The dynamic of globalization is intense and moving at a fast pace. This wave of
cosmopolitanization has critical implications for the notion of ‘state-citizenship’, previ-
ously determined by a simple test of certain attributes. However, the new types of
residents in a bordered, borderless world that globalization has given birth to, demand a
reconceptualization of citizenship, one that includes them and protects their interests
adequately. Brysk and Shafir aptly describe the challenge as one requiring a “balance
between ‘citizenship deficit’ due to the contraction of political democracy, and ‘citizen-
ship surplus’, created by new venues of political influence” (Brysk and Shafir 2004).
Whilst a new structure of unterritorialised supranational rights is coming into play, it
does not comprehensively define, inform or attend to this new concept of citizenship in
terms of membership, accountability or justice. As Soysal notes, we are in a space
between ‘postnational citizenship’, an era in which the sovereign-statehood model of
citizen rights is transitioning to a realmwhere (some) rights are conferred internationally.
The state-centric model has not as yet been abandoned (Soysal 1995). However,
Soysal’s thesis that universal human rights are the projected replacement for citizen-
ship rights has been rightly criticized by others, such as Joppke, who notes that the
nation will still be indispensible to the integration of immigrants (1999). The rela-
tionship between the local and the international citizen needs to be critically explored
to determine the duties and rights of the national, the overseas national, the immigrant
or the citizen immigrant, and to assess the junctures at which these identities intersect
and complement or override each other. Given the inadequacy of existing measures to
nurture a healthy sense of national and cultural attachment, a better understanding of
the construction of identity, cultural identifications and attachments is required.
Re-examining identity and culture
Recent scholarship in anthropology, political philosophy and psychology has made it
increasingly clear that cultural and identity formation processes are not uniform
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across cultures or groups. Moreover, the formation of culture and the constitution of
individual and group identity are complex processes that cannot be tracked back to
any singular influences of ‘culture’ or national ‘inheritance’. Rather, cultural traits
and attachments develop sporadically based on one’s exposure to different ‘Symbolic
Orders’ (Kearney and Adachi forthcoming, 2012). In today’s global age, the local has
become a microcosm of the global. Singular symbolic orders are complemented by
multiple symbolic orders, working simultaneously to influence the development of
one’s identity. These attachments cannot be broken down neatly into any single
category pertaining to culture, ethnicity or nationality.
This scholarship needs to be studied in greater detail by political theorists and
constitutional law scholars to question what it is about culture and identity that
warrants protection and to unpack the components that inform the development of
culture and its attendant processes. Furthermore, the broader questions concerning
identity, its formation and its entanglement with concepts of culture require critical
review in light of the proliferation of movement of goods, people, values and
practices. Broadly, flawed assumptions about the homogeneity of culture often form
the foundational premise for the recognition of group-based rights. The misguided
emphases of existing policies on the homogeneity of culture and the uniformity of its
expression inhere in both the liberal and multicultural paradigms and have resulted in
the misrecognition of minorities, their identities, values and needs. A less than
adequate understanding of these complex questions have distorted politics and
dialogue about the representation of groups and individuals in political frameworks
and the meaning of culture and identity relative to such frameworks.
This section attempts to unpack these concepts to highlight the importance of a
thorough deconstruction of culture and identity and their role and impact on the
possibilities for living a meaningful life. An improved understanding of the (flawed)
underlying premises of their existing conceptualization would facilitate the develop-
ment of a more suitable framework through which culture and identity can be more
effectively recognized and protected.
Identity-matrixing: understanding the construction of modern identity
Recent literature has extensively documented the various influences on the construc-
tion of the “self” (Lacan 1998). Jacques Lacan has introduced the “conception of the
mirror stage” as a novel representation of the process of the construction of the self,
which, he claims challenges the understanding of the self as a derivative of one’s
cognitive perceptions (1998). Through this theory, Lacan has sought to establish that
the human being’s self-image undergoes a transformative period. The “mirror stage”
consists of a phase of identification which “situates the agency of the ego, before its
social determination, in a fictional direction” (Lacan 1998). Although this process is
internal, the individual’s environment and its social language are applied to this
mirror self-image to transform it into the realm of culture and other social indicators
to constitute a social-self, which contributes to that person’s individuality. These
social indicators are called the “Symbolic Order” (Lacan et al. 1998).
Kearney and Adachi have interpreted the Symbolic Order as a “set of cultural
constructions that is matrixed into individuals; this Symbolic Order provides the
content and structure from which identity is formulated; it imparts of the ideologies,
286 P. Kapai
realities, and beliefs that constitute thought and the discursive formations that govern
it” (forthcoming 2012). However, invaluable as Lacan’s contribution is to enhancing
our understanding of the construction of human identity, it bears a notable gap given
its lack of account of the transcultural societies in which identity formation occurs
today (Kearney and Adachi forthcoming, 2012). The transcultural conditions today
reveal the existence and interplay of multiple Symbolic Orders (Kearney and Adachi
forthcoming, 2012). Each individual therefore, inhabits multiple Symbolic Orders
unless they live in isolated cultural groupings whereby the lack of interaction with
other Symbolic Orders makes this an unlikely possibility.
Kearney and Adachi propose a complex model of “identity-matrixing” which
captures the process in which the construction of an individual’s identity takes place
across transcultural settings and within which people constitute their identities
through exposure to the external influence of multiple Symbolic Orders (forthcoming
2012). This matrixing across the numerous strata, vertical and horizontal, offered
within each Symbolic Order provides the basis for the formation of a unique and
individual identity (Kearney and Adachi forthcoming, 2012). Thus, vertical matrixing
describes cultural constructions transmitted within a closed societal set within a
particular Symbolic Order whereas, horizontal matrixing accounts for the process
whereby cultural constructions are transmitted across parallel societal sets represent-
ing different symbolic orders (Kearney and Adachi forthcoming, 2012). Viewed in
this manner, human identity is the result of a complex process of transcultural
interactions, aptly depicted by such matrixing processes which function across
economic, social, religious, ethnic and other groupings, both horizontally and verti-
cally. As identity-matrixing reveals, people transform as they interact with other
cultural structures, giving them the option to embrace norms from other systems,
resulting in a unique self-identity which is not exclusively grounded in any single culture
or identity. As Nussbaum notes, individuals have the capabilities to develop multiple
identities, grounding their attachment to their cultural and national value-systems as well
as to “the worldwide community of human beings” (Nussbaum 1996).
The key, therefore, must be to recognize the role of culture in the development of
identities and to facilitate cultural learning by protecting interactive and developmen-
tal learning in the community or ‘in-group’ context. This is very different from
protection of an abstract or intangible ‘body of ideas’ loosely defined as ‘culture’,
the attributes of which can rarely be defined accurately or identified as a complete
body of specific values. It is more accurate to describe the object of such protections
as ‘processes that nurture cultural development and enable human flourishing.’
Tapping into the dynamism of identity-matrixing: understanding its potential
for reorganizing political engagement
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, to conceive of culture and identity as fixed
concepts that are frozen and incapable of being influenced or evolving as they interact
with other stimuli, is an oversimplified understanding of communities, peoples and
multicultural societies today. Various forces combine in societies today presenting a
unique experience of identity-construction to all individuals and groups, particularly
in multicultural societies. To strive for a commitment to inclusion of those represent-
ing minority cultures or worldviews within both, mainstream and minority
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communities, the state must acknowledge difference and its complex manifestations
that are neither monolithic in nature, nor static. Noting the dynamic processes and
influences that impact the formation of identity and attachment to culture, the state
must strive to implement structurally inclusive mechanisms that provide equal op-
portunities to enable positive and meaningful interaction with and to give expression
to different cultural paradigms within the national culture. These mechanisms would
more accurately reflect the interactive dialectic between national and local cultures,
their interconnections and their invariable impact on each other.
Crucially, a better understanding of the formation of identities and the role of
culture, national origin and other attributes in this process would enable the polity to
be organized to accurately reflect the realities of citizens’ identities. Recognizing the
inherent fluidity of what one might refer to as our ‘peripheral identities’, and the
influences we are susceptible to as we interact with others individually and as groups,
there is hope that the fixed boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ will begin to blur as
groups come to a consensus on different issues and recognize a commitment to
common ideals. This is provided that the necessary political structures to facilitate
meaningful interaction are put into place and a civic ethos of responsible and virtuous
citizenship is cultivated to make the most of such interactions. All of this has
significant implications for citizen participation, inter-group dialogue and ultimately,
the cultivation of ‘national’ belonging. Ultimately, a movement in this direction can
help depoliticize the political arena and enable public discourse to be used more
fruitfully to arrive at deliberated decisions that reflect the collective will in its true sense.
In light of this dynamic infiltration of cultural value systems crossing each other,
the political process firstly, needs to reconsider and account for its implicit registra-
tion of difference based on cultural, religious or other differential identity-marker that
dilutes the expression of the voter’s will relative to that of the majority. Second, there
is a critical need to address the citizenship ‘gap’ that results from liberal and
multicultural policies in their current expressions. Third, in fully recognizing the
dynamism of the process through which identity and cultural attachments are formed,
multicultural societies need to establish mechanisms that positively influence this
process of identity-construction so as to yield sentiments that reflect national as well
as cultural attachments and minimize the marginalization of minorities. This can only
be achieved through a structured, long-term reform of educational curricula to include
democratic citizenship education directed at the cultivation of strong civic values
including recognition, reciprocity, equality and the use of reason in public discourse.
Fourth, these processes can positively impact the development of inter-cultural loyalties
and allegiance such as the kind most critically required in multi-nation society.
Interrogation modern democratic practices
Outdated approaches to characterizing modern identity and the nature of citizenship
today have resulted in the exclusion of immigrants and ethnic minorities from
meaningful participation in the society. They are sometimes incorporated into the
state’s political framework when they fulfill stringent conditions imposing an alien
value system on them. Despite formal inclusion, these groups find it difficult to
participate in practice for a number of reasons, including the lack of a suitable space
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for reasoned discourse to communicate their interests effectively, feelings of disloca-
tion, discrimination or the fear of reprisal or exclusion. This results in their margin-
alization in participatory governance and the development of relevant law and policy.
The entrenchment of practices and frameworks of exclusion is the subject of a
contentious critique in political theory and theories of justice. Having briefly cri-
tiqued some of the existing paradigms of political governance of difference, it is
important to correct perceptions of indifference, passivity and lack of capacity often
attributed to the minorities and to locate the source of the problem.
Numerous theorists have criticized modern democratic systems for their lack of
depth and engagement of the masses in the pre-decision-making moments.
Democratic moments in many countries today represent a mere aggregation of the
group’s collective interests, as opposed to a deliberated account of their political will.
In multicultural societies, democracy appears to be operating at its weakest. Liberal
values and practices have long been championed as engendering in the public the
desire to participate in decision-making through discussion of contentious issues of
legal, social and political consequence and the liberal framework provides the space
to do so. Through engagement in the public sphere, the market place of ideas enables
the best ideas to come to the fore. However, as modern critics of the market-
dominated paradigm have lamented, the system is subject to manipulation and
domination by the most powerful voices. Likewise, political discussions are often
dominated by mainstream voices due to inequalities of power.
Democratic practices reinforce the majority group’s stronghold in politics, en-
abling them to steer the course of policy, oftentimes, to the detriment of minority
interests. This has called into question the effectiveness of democratic mechanisms
employed in determining the political will. Counter-majoritarian mechanisms remain
weak as constitutional courts designed to safeguard minority interests reflect a strong
commitment to the national public interest, political stability and with a view to avoid
getting embroiled in judgments that bear serious political consequences. More
importantly, however, they shy away from overstepping their constitutionally pre-
scribed roles as interpreters of the law as opposed to engaging in policy-making from
the bench. In cases involving conflicts between liberal values and cultural and
religious beliefs or practices, judges apply the liberal constitutional framework
usually prioritizing the twin values of equality and non-discrimination, which remain
sacrosanct.4
Additionally, current democratic practice reveals that the mechanisms traditionally
used for debate and engagement have lapsed into the monotony of ‘routine’ vote-
casting which decision is taken by individuals after a short period of self-reflection (if
at all), rather than after vigorous debate and engagement with civil society institu-
tions. Politics, thus, is marred by the decisions made by groups of self-interested
4 This leaves the position of the minority particularly precarious in multicultural societies. Although there
are decisions that reflect that judges do consider minority positions, in the majority of cases still, the
reasoning reflects a failure to fully consider all dimensions of the impact of a decision or a position on the
minority group concerned. This is usually the result of inherent limitations of the adversarial process which
leaves it to the parties to define the pleadings and thereby, the issues at trial. This constrains judges in how
they approach the issues in during their determinations. Furthermore, dealing with complex issues of this
nature through courts inevitably means that the developments in law will be piecemeal since resources are
finite and judges have to make economic use of these resources.
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individuals who vote collectively to follow their own agendas. It appears that
nationalistic sentiments that may at one time have been the motivation behind
thinking and acting in pursuit of the common good has increasingly been replaced
by self-interested decision-making, fueled by consumerism, isolation from
community-contexts and a general culture of making pragmatic decisions based on
economic or materialistic considerations rather than ethical or moral reasoning
informed by the duties that come with the privilege of enfranchisement. The process
of voting and campaigning has been taken over by propaganda and materialism,
which attract or split voters on issue-specific bases rather than a complete platform for
the overall improvement of the community. As such, it has been argued that modern
societies suffer from a democratic deficit (Fishkin 2009, 2010).
These circumstances beckon a reconfiguration of political institutions. It is suggested
that by prefacing the democratic moment with a series of dialogic and deliberative
processes, this ‘democratic deficit’ can be addressed. This would enrich the quality of
political discussion and allow deliberation on the basis of the actual issues as opposed to
allowing the discussion to be dominated by identity politics. However, to achieve this,
the deliberative setting and actors need to be prepared for the exercise, which is no small
task. This involves recourse to a virtuous ethics of citizenship and political participation:
one that is inclusive and cultivates the values of substantive equality, autonomy and
responsibility towards other members of the polity.
Citizenship re-conceptualized: the promise of deliberative theory
in promoting reasoned discourse and cultivating loyalties
The state-centric vision of government has been viewed as an institution resulting
from a set of independent administrative processes which lead to decisions that
legitimize state action. However, a more citizen-centered vision of governance can
serve to enhance the democratic legitimacy of decisions, particularly those regarding
conflicting norms, thereby providing a more effective model for governance in
multicultural communities. The concept of citizenship as membership needs to be
revisited to account for the realities of the borderless world, in which political units do
not necessarily congregate territorially. Moreover, the role of minorities needs to be
extended beyond ‘subjects’ and reconstituted as political actors with civic responsi-
bility. Given the fundamental role of memory in the construction of identities, a
political process premised upon inclusive governance will create new memories and
cultivate belonging in the larger community.
A revised conceptualization of citizenship as political agency is more appropriate
in light of the fluidity of contemporary transcultural identities. Developing an insti-
tutional framework that supports citizenship as political agency rather than member-
ship based on fixed attributes and a deliberative political framework can better
effectuate inclusive political participation and create new spaces for belonging. A
deliberative process that is substantively inclusive can shed light on the bases of
difference and a political space within a rational discussion can ensue. It would also
promote a culture for civic action through the recognition of the input of multiple
groups and the principle of reciprocity and public reason to undergird meaningful and
substantive participation.
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The challenge is to find a value system which resonates with these complex
individuals in light of their multiple memberships so that it mobilizes feelings of
belonging and responsibility towards a particular nation-state and invests them in its
success. This requires the denationalization of citizenship and grounding belonging in
political process and participation rather than physical or cultural signifiers of identity
(Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001; Aleinikoff and Klyusmeyer 2000, 2002), thus
reconstituting citizenship as ‘performative’ as opposed to merely, status-bearing.
It is argued that deliberative theory is a framework that provides an integrated
response to the challenge of modern citizenship in multicultural societies. As dis-
cussed earlier, democratic moments today represent a mere aggregation of the
society’s collective interests. Without a process to guide preference-formation, citi-
zens often cast votes on misguided bases without understanding electoral platforms or
the consequences of certain policies. Deliberative democracy provides an organiza-
tional context for meaningful dialogue between stakeholders, producing outcomes
that have benefited from public reasoning and discussion among equals. The frame-
work is premised on an exchange of public reasons and justification, which serve to
legitimize the outcomes of the deliberative process (Kahane et al. 2010). The
emphasis on public reason means participants must refrain from referring to contested
conceptions of the good life in order to increase the likelihood of persuading others of
their reason. It provides an opportunity for dialogue, engagement and to persuade
others of their position with the confidence that their voices will be heard based on
the principle of reciprocity, which is a critical element of deliberative processes
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996).
This interactive deliberative space can also help negate exclusion, and ultimately
minimize areas of conflict. It can foster critical reflection across cultures to root out
stagnant practices and beliefs that are no longer held. This reflexivity should be
fostered across all groups and is a healthy quality for value systems of various
orientations. The deliberative democratic model can help build solidarity through
these opportunities and at the same time, serve as a venue where the act of partici-
pation can and community engagement cultivates feelings of belonging and attach-
ment across cultural groups to produce an inclusive polity, forging new collective and
individual identities through exposure to multiple value systems. These identities will
primarily be grounded in the commitment to civic engagement, harnessing the
performative aspiration of modern citizenship. Inclusion and interaction in the public
sphere will ultimately develop and deepen inter-cultural trust and understanding.
Whilst the democratization of the political setting may be a progressive step, it is
meaningless if equality of access to democratic dialogue is granted in 'form' but not
substance. For a system to be representative in fact, it must be undergirded by a
systematic search for different voices that ought to be represented. This is essential if
deliberation is to yield a meaningful outcome based on an accurate depiction of the
different positions as opposed to ‘surrogate’ representation based on false assump-
tions about shared belief systems. This can be achieved through nominations or
elections within different sub-groups. This will help ensure substantive participation.
The difficulty is the uncertainty that surrounds the reasoning process, if any, which
leads to support for a particular decision. Outcomes are perceived as just when they
can be directly correlated with reasoned judgment, thereby making them widely
acceptable. Decisions which rest on reason are viewed as legitimate given the positive
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relationship implied between reason and justice. Conversely, outcomes lose their
independent validity when they are perceived as stemming purely from sentiments
of loyalty. In these cases, decisions are viewed as tainted by the bias that accompanies
the support of members who allow group membership, identity or other common
cause to influence their decision. It is difficult to trace decisions back to a particular
line of reasoning as opposed to the sentiment of loyalty or prejudice, factors that often
accompany decision-making generally.
Moreover, deliberative processes cannot be successful if the very basic source of
some peoples’ worldviews is excluded from the repository from which they make
sense of their lives. A basic condition for trust requires complete openness to all
reasons proffered in the process of deliberation if genuine understanding is to be
cultivated between divided communities. Thus, the claim by deliberative democrats
that only reasons that are acceptable to the ‘general population’ may be advanced as
acceptable reasons for particular positions does not satisfy this requirement. There
must be some leeway to allow arguments to materialize for a meaningful exchange to
occur and determine the scope of disagreement.
Habermas requires that norms be validated independently of sentiment, i.e. that
they should rely on reason (Habermas 1996). Rawls, on the other hand, requires a
constructivist approach towards the universal through a law of peoples which reaches
out to all groups and communities (Rawls 1999).5 For Rawls, what is reasonable it
different from what is rational (means-end rationality). Rawls often also invokes
‘practical reason’ as represented by an independent human faculty, free from subjec-
tive influences to help achieve the Habermasian task of discerning a ‘transcultural
moral validity.’ This universality of morals commands legitimacy. But is this what
Rawls means? Rorty thinks he is actually referring to actual principles and concep-
tions as in fact arrived at in the course of creating a community (Rorty 1997).
Therefore, practical reason is a process—rather than substance of agreement about
universal norms. However, it remains to be questioned whether indeed, Rawls and
Habermas share similar objectives. Rorty claims they are similar, particularly in light
of their endorsement of Thomas Scanlon’s answer to the “fundamental question why
anyone should care about morality at all,” namely that “we have a basic desire to be
able to justify our actions to others on grounds that they could not reasonably reject—
reasonably, that is, given the desire to find principles that others similarly motivated
could not reasonably reject” (Rawls 1996; Rorty 1997). The ultimate goal is to appeal
to ideas that others similarly appeal to so as to be able to justify the action suggested.
Rorty has examined this relationship between justice and loyalty as explanations for
particular judgments, questioning whether the notion of loyalty should be expanded
to include a larger group of people so as to render it equivalent to an acceptable
concept of justice (Rorty 1997). Through regularity in the exercise of finding or
discovering overlapping interests and beliefs, there are prospects for enlarging the
circle of loyalty.
Thus, the aim is to provide reasons for embracing a larger group into your circle of
loyalty for the same reasons that underscore your current sphere of loyalty. In
Walzer’s terms, this would mean creating alternative ‘moral identities’ (Walzer
1994). Rorty’s suggestion is that by drawing on these ideas, one can make a case
5 This alludes to Rawls’ ‘overlapping consensus’ theory.
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for interest-based appeal rather than belief-based appeal (Rorty 1997). This helps
eliminate controversies about cultural or religious practices or minority rights. This
view accords with Michael Walzer’s notion that morality is inherently thick, inter-
mingled with cultural beliefs and systems. ‘Thin’ principles can only be derived in
special circumstances where the occasion calls for it in particular cases (Walzer
1994).
Although this approach is commendable, it does not cater to or account for those
groups whose exercise of rationality or reason is derived from cultural or religious
constructs and beliefs. There is however, promise to his proposal on how the creation
of alternative moral identities can be facilitated. Rorty presents rationality and the
acquisition of loyalty as part of the same activity (1997). He hints at how the circle of
loyalty can be expanded by producing unforced agreements between different groups.
This will assist in the dissolution of ‘otherness’ through processes which reveal the
‘other’ as reasonable or trustworthy people. He argues for the need to view reason not
as a source of authority (as Kant or Plato would), but rather, as a process of
facilitating agreement by persuasion. As time goes on, a continuum is produced
along which, there are varying degrees of consonance between beliefs and interests.
As these instances of overlap increase, there is increasing compromise, deference and
trust. Gradually, these sentiments find expression through the development of loyalty
towards a group (Rorty 1997).
Rorty surmises that moral identity therefore, boils down to the groups with which
one identifies (1997). A common identity compels loyalty which undergirds moral
behaviour that would befit a group member. This concept of identity is a ‘shifting’
concept which takes on a form depending on the associations we feel bound by or
answerable to. Similarly, our moral compass is tugged in different directions depend-
ing on these affiliations. Walzer explains this with reference to our level of knowledge
about the people we deal with. We have a thicker account of those we are familiar
with and therefore, are on certain ground when we need to apply a moral analysis to
decide how they are to be treated. It is all part of the shared system of knowledge
which makes our actions understandable (therefore moral) to them. Once we distance
ourselves from in-group members and need to decide how out-group members are to
be treated, we rely on systems of ‘law’ to dictate the appropriateness of our actions
because we only have a ‘thin’ conception of them (Rorty 1997). On this account,
there is no ‘core’ or ‘basic’ self that espouses universal values by virtue of our human
identity or principles derived purely from ‘reason’ and therefore prior to our ‘subjec-
tive’ loyalties. 6 If this is an accurate depiction of the human identity, then we must
accept the plurality of identities and incorporate their fluidity into our decision-
making processes.
This alone, however, would not guarantee the exercise of one’s civic duties to
participate in democratic decision-making. A further dimension to responsible and
participatory citizenship pertains to the influences on the decision-making process
itself. A critical element in developing trust within diverse communities is the
transparency of the decision-making process and the underlying positions adopted
by different parties in arriving at those decisions. Whether those positions are
6 Clearly, this account is non-Kantian in the sense that it seeks to premise morality on grounds other than
the capacity for human reasoning, which Kant believed governed moral imperatives.
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informed by reason, morality, pragmatism or prejudice, self-interest and power will
strongly affect the development of trust within multicultural societies. Therefore,
Gutmann approaches the question of cultivating civic responsibility from the per-
spective that the primary ingredient must necessarily be the cultivation of a moral
commitment to justice, rather than to any community (2002).
According to Gutmann, “Doing what is right cannot be reduced to loyalty to, or
identification with, any existing group of human beings” (p. 69). The capacity to
determine the morally right decision will necessarily result in upholding the funda-
mental guarantees of equality and non-discrimination. Whilst this position is un-
doubtedly ideal, it can only be achieved progressively, rather than all at once. Initially,
relying on reason, pragmatism and trust, processes designed to tap into public opinion
will solicit public opinion through fair systems that provide for equality of access and
opportunity. Justice follows as part of the ‘justice as fairness’ approach but is
complemented by the trust that has been built through a reason-based discussion that
breeds affiliation and commitment through the appeal of reason and trust rather than
‘loyalty’ grounded in nationalism or race or other attributes external to the processes
of political participation. Gutmann, however, ignores the inevitable influence of
identity on feelings and the effect of sentimentality on capacities for reasoning (at a
subconscious level) as well as loyalty to reason over emotion.
As Sunstein notes, depending on the particular conceptions of justice and democ-
racy one adopts, a polity may be required to make a choice as to its overriding priority
between justice and democracy. On this view, if justice is to be prioritized, then
democracy would need to be accordingly limited. On the other hand, if democracy is
to be prioritized, then this may mean compromising certain principles of justice.
However, there are also ways in which the two can be mutually reinforcing (1997).
One understanding of democracy is that it entails a deliberative exercise whereby
preference-formation is facilitated through deliberation and reasoned discussion. In
this institutional arrangement, the outcomes which result are considered ‘just’ as a
result of the reason-based process through which preferences formed, critiqued and
reformed. Through a representative system of politics where decision-makers are held
accountable to the deliberative voice and its reason, this deliberative version of
democracy responds to the criticisms of democracy as adopted in its pure form as a
system of one-man-one-vote without accounting for the role and value of reason or
the space and tools required for preference formation and its facilitation and comple-
ments these two versions to render a more effective democracy in the true sense of the
word (Sunstein 1997).
The question often asked is whether there is a conflict between the appeal to
interest as opposed to appeal to reason in arriving at agreements. Reason can be
influenced by both, reason and interest. One view of justice relies on reason. The
other derives legitimacy through the utilization of just processes which assume the
outcome produced to bear the hallmarks of justice (Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’
approach). Thus, one may begin with an ‘interest-based’ appeal to expand the circle
of loyalty. Once numbers have accumulated, the system can then progress towards
procedural fairness and ultimately, to reason-based justice, seeking a more perfect and
just society.
Given the challenges that accompany deliberation in multicultural settings, it is
pertinent to recognize the impossibility of agreement on meta-issues at the outset and
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to begin the trust-building, loyalty-enlarging process with simpler questions that need
addressing. One possible approach is to adopt Sunstein’s view. Forced attempts at
complete agreement over high-level theory about basic questions would only increase
tensions and affirm the skepticism of parties belonging to different groups that no
consensus is indeed possible between them across the board. He posits that seeking
agreement over the complete theorization of questions which are so heavily contested
(both, in intra- and inter-group settings) is unnecessary and undesirable (Sunstein
1997). This is primarily because identity politics have often dominated the process of
any genuine agreement being reached between different interest groups. A classic
strategy deployed by numerous political ‘camps’ to further divide groups and usurp
the function of any targeted deliberation geared towards reaching a compromise or
agreement has been to link other contentious questions that lie on the peripheral
boundaries of the issue being considered. This conflation of political issues distorts
the political process, heightens inter-group tensions and confirms group polarization
theories (Fishkin 2009), rendering it less likely that groups would see their interests
converging. This jeopardizes any prospects of a meaningful dialogue or the enlarge-
ment of the ‘circle of loyalty’. The atmosphere for effective deliberation is purged due
to continued distrust.
Whilst various studies have revealed that deliberation, even in informal or limited-
question contexts, have an immense empowering and emancipatory effect on those
who partake in the process, social inequalities have long been known to affect
political inclusion due to a lack of civic education. These capacities need to be built
across different groups in order to defeat the social inequalities that render certain
groups least likely to be included in political participation despite inclusive measures.
This implicates a unique and significant role for citizenship education.
Citizenship education: cultivating capacities for deliberation
In order for this vision of enlightened deliberative engagement that is inter-cultural
and intra-cultural to materialize, apart from the institutional reforms that are required
at the political level, there is a critical need to re-examine the values that we nurture at
schools. One only has to consider the deep-rooted nature of inequalities, discrimina-
tion and prejudice within our communities to imagine the leap forward that is
required if we are to prepare our children to be effective in negotiating the value
pluralism that increasingly pervades the communities that we live in today. The
characteristics that need to be fostered to instill in the leaders of tomorrow the virtues
of reflexivity and reciprocity and the ability to draw a distinction between reason and
emotion or interest (Kahane, et al. 2010).
Although numerous schools introduce students to some form of civic education,
students invariably receive lessons in national history and citizen values that are
deeply entwined with nationalism and selectively highlight events of national pride.
Oftentimes, the curriculum is designed to present an image of the nation that is
glorious, representative of noble values and beliefs, its peoples as homogenous and as
having traits that are characteristic of their national culture. The stories that are told of
national heroes usually present a demonized enemy over whom their peoples, were
righteously victorious. The books and materials used are usually similarly oriented,
Developing Capacities for Inclusive Citizenship in Multicultural Societies… 295
presenting images that portray a homogenous group of being who descend from this
proud historical national heritage and as such are rooted in the land. These illustra-
tions tend to present a skewed perspective on what is, in fact, the myth of the ‘nation
state’ and in today’s day, represent a figment of the ‘national imagination’ that is
routinely drawn on by politicians, educators, parents and others in positions of power,
to indoctrinate a young nation into commitment to a culture, an ethos and most
importantly, to a peoples who are presented as singularly having an a priori right to
the territorial boundaries within which their nation has claimed statehood.
Necessarily, in amulticultural society, immigrant children, be they first, secondor third
generation immigrants, fail to see themselves in this national imaginary. Likewise, other
children fail to see them as part of their national reality. Therein are sowed the seeds of
exclusion, the justification for differential treatment and the legitimacy of distinctive
treatment. In order to ensure that we help cultivate values that will lend future citizens
naturally to the kindofbehavior that is desirable and conducive to effective deliberation in
a plural society, children need to receive citizenship education that is firmly committed to
an agenda to impart a range of values. These should include, firstly, an understanding that
any position requires justification that is based on reason. Second, they must respect the
process of deliberative decision-making primarily by respecting the value of the public
exchange of reasons. Third, any exercise entailing reasoned engagement with others
requires that the principle of reciprocity be adhered to whereby they are taught the
importance andmorality ofmaintaining an openmind in considering the force of reasons
offered by viewpoints that differ from their own (Kahane, et al. 2010). Fourth, they must
recognize that at times, their reasons may not be treated as persuasive of a position
and in those circumstances, their argument, being the weaker of the few may result in
a detrimental impact on their self-interest. Fifth, they must learn to distance the
impact of the negative outcomes that are inevitable in the course of such processes
from time to time, and their moral duty to continue to engage in and contribute to the
political process despite the fact that such occurrences may recur. Sixth, where such
an outcome has resulted, they must consider the underlying reasons for it. Engaging
in self-reflexive exercise through a perspective that is temporarily detached from their
self-interest should be inculcated as a desirous and virtuous endeavor insofar as it is
aimed at gaining a better understanding of the distance between the public reason and
their private reason. Finally, they must recognize the morality of a continual critique
of past decisions and the reasons proffered with a view to the possibility of arriving at
even better decisions undergirded by strong reasons for change. This builds in the
reflexivity across decisions and time, fostering a process that is continually enriched
through its inward gaze.
Conclusion
A systemized process which serves to inculcate values that mobilize citizens into
civically responsible citizens would greatly enhance the overall quality of democratic
decision-making and issue-resolution in multicultural societies. The quality assurance
comes from the fact that individual and group interests from various backgrounds will
be better understood in light of an education that has served to enhance such
understanding between different communities.
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Such ‘home-grown’ processes of inclusion, belonging and dialogue are critical in
generating commitment towards a multicultural polity and encourage the exercise of
civic responsibilities. They also positively influence identity-construction, feelings of
belonging and attachment. Substantive deliberation through these means could well
serve as the beginning of a slow but long-term process of inclusion and belonging.
The sooner this sense of civic and virtuous responsibility is cultivated and tapped
into, the more adept the members become at engaging in a process of collective
deliberation. Interactions between groups that are mediated through public reason to
produce collective agreements may be the first step in the long journey towards
building the social conditions needed to accompany constitutional and legal change.
We need social forces, processes and a citizenry committed to performing its duties to
accompany constitutional and political processes rather than have blind faith in the
constitution or judges to achieve justice.
Through citizenship education that focuses on the development of capacities for the
virtuous exercise of one’s civic responsibilities, it is possible to enhance understanding
and forge loyalties across cultures by appealing to the strength of unity in diversity. Such
a reconstituted political dynamic incorporating civic responsibility and deliberative
access would go a long way towards complementing existing theories of justice and
building on their framework to foreshadow an inclusive multicultural society.
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